That Nuclear Button:
Facts, Fiction and Safeguards for Presidents
Mr. Jon Wolfsthal
Facts, Fiction and Safeguards for Presidents
Mr. Jon Wolfsthal
DINNER - REGISTRATION CLOSED
15 March, 2018 Tucson Country Club
Social Hour: 5:30; Dinner 6:15; Speaker and Discussion: 7:00
SPOILER ALERT: There is no nuclear button on the president’s desk. But complex procedures are in place for dealing with nuclear threats. These include early warnings, threat evaluations and presidential authorization for a range of attack options. Each step involves an elaborate system of communication and authentication. These procedures have governed our nuclear command and control systems since the Cold War, but have been improved with technical modernization and enhanced safeguards.
The current fears of nuclear conflict, whether from a deliberate decision by the president or by a miscalculation, stem from the convergence of several factors. First is the president’s nuclear exuberance demonstrated in his “fire and fury” threats against North Korea.
Second is the steep learning curve required to master the intricacies of deterrence, the capabilities of our nuclear arsenal, and the effects of a nuclear exchange.
Third, against this backdrop the Trump administration has published a new Nuclear Posture Review, the government’s first since 2010. This comprehensive document outlines the nation’s nuclear capabilities and the conditions under which these weapons might be used. Current U.S. policy states that the president will consider using nuclear weapons only if another nuclear state launches a nuclear attack or a massive conventional attack against the United States or its allies — in other words, only in the most extreme circumstances.
The new Nuclear Posture Review mostly reiterates previous commitments. It defends spending $1.25 trillion to modernize the three components of our nuclear arsenal. But two points in the new document have raised concerns. The first is that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to several types of non-nuclear attacks, including biological, chemical, or cyber weapons. The review says, explicitly and several times, that the country now sees an increased role for nuclear weapons in our strategic planning. The second source of alarm is its statement that the United States will build new nuclear weapons for precisely this purpose—thus making the escalation to nuclear war more seamless and possibly more tempting.
To sort through this policy minefield we are fortunate to welcome Jon Wolfsthal.
Jon Wolfsthal is the former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs and senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and nonproliferation. Before that, he was Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in Monterey. He joined Monterey after having been Special Advisor to Vice President Joseph R. Biden for nuclear security and nonproliferation and as a director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council from 2009-2012.
During his time in Government he was involved in almost every aspect of U.S. nuclear weapons, arms control, nonproliferation and security policy. He helped negotiate and secure the ratification of the New START arms reduction agreement with the Russian Federation, and helped support the development of nuclear policy including through the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and other elements of the Obama Administration's security policies.
DINNER - REGISTRATION CLOSED
Meal Selections for the dinner include:
Blue Corn Crusted Tilapia
Chicken Picatta
Vegetable Lasagna
15 March, 2018 Tucson Country Club
Social Hour: 5:30; Dinner 6:15; Speaker and Discussion: 7:00
SPOILER ALERT: There is no nuclear button on the president’s desk. But complex procedures are in place for dealing with nuclear threats. These include early warnings, threat evaluations and presidential authorization for a range of attack options. Each step involves an elaborate system of communication and authentication. These procedures have governed our nuclear command and control systems since the Cold War, but have been improved with technical modernization and enhanced safeguards.
The current fears of nuclear conflict, whether from a deliberate decision by the president or by a miscalculation, stem from the convergence of several factors. First is the president’s nuclear exuberance demonstrated in his “fire and fury” threats against North Korea.
Second is the steep learning curve required to master the intricacies of deterrence, the capabilities of our nuclear arsenal, and the effects of a nuclear exchange.
Third, against this backdrop the Trump administration has published a new Nuclear Posture Review, the government’s first since 2010. This comprehensive document outlines the nation’s nuclear capabilities and the conditions under which these weapons might be used. Current U.S. policy states that the president will consider using nuclear weapons only if another nuclear state launches a nuclear attack or a massive conventional attack against the United States or its allies — in other words, only in the most extreme circumstances.
The new Nuclear Posture Review mostly reiterates previous commitments. It defends spending $1.25 trillion to modernize the three components of our nuclear arsenal. But two points in the new document have raised concerns. The first is that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to several types of non-nuclear attacks, including biological, chemical, or cyber weapons. The review says, explicitly and several times, that the country now sees an increased role for nuclear weapons in our strategic planning. The second source of alarm is its statement that the United States will build new nuclear weapons for precisely this purpose—thus making the escalation to nuclear war more seamless and possibly more tempting.
To sort through this policy minefield we are fortunate to welcome Jon Wolfsthal.
Jon Wolfsthal is the former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs and senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and nonproliferation. Before that, he was Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in Monterey. He joined Monterey after having been Special Advisor to Vice President Joseph R. Biden for nuclear security and nonproliferation and as a director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council from 2009-2012.
During his time in Government he was involved in almost every aspect of U.S. nuclear weapons, arms control, nonproliferation and security policy. He helped negotiate and secure the ratification of the New START arms reduction agreement with the Russian Federation, and helped support the development of nuclear policy including through the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and other elements of the Obama Administration's security policies.
DINNER - REGISTRATION CLOSED
Meal Selections for the dinner include:
Blue Corn Crusted Tilapia
Chicken Picatta
Vegetable Lasagna